ABSTRACT: In this response paper, I argue that types of meanings in linguistic utterances which lie beyond propositional meaning can hardly be subsumed in only one category called implicational meaning. Many of these levels of meaning allow for restricted comparisons of their correspondence to levels of meaning in musical utterances.
meaning as an instrument to achieve illocutionary acts: I can show you a picture of a fact that I perceive as being the case in the world we are referring to in order to instruct you or warn you or delight you, in short, to realize communicative acts which add to the construction of a meaningful social reality. I can act in many different ways using propositions, e.g., I can ask if you think that this proposition is true in our world, I can demand that you change something in the world to make it similar to a desirable world which we construct in our discourse by propositions or I can put a new piece of knowledge about our world into our discourse. Since illocutions are communicative acts grounded in social behaviour, the application of illocutions to musical meaning seems to be straightforward: If we keep out those illocutions which rely on propositions, we find that many illocutionary acts may be conveyed also by music, since musical events surely are actions in social communication (see Cross & Tolbert, 2009 , and literature cited there). In linguistic utterances, illocutions like assertions and questions can be coded by special words (so called performative verbs), through syntax (inversion, Wh-constructions and so on), and by intonation, a term which, different to its use in music theory, means the phonological representation of pitch contours in linguistics. In most languages, rising boundary tones convey questions, while falls normally convey assertion. While these illocutions rely on propositions, others do not: Searle's (1969) expressive acts, which give hints about emotional states and attitudes of the speaker, and possibly also some commissive and directive acts, may reveal similarities to musical meanings on both sides of the sign, content and expression.
Intonation also is an important tool for conversational structure (Sacks et al., 1974) . This is another domain of linguistic meaning, which serves to organise turn-taking in dialogues. Here we find cross-linguistically stable form-meaning pairs at boundaries of intonational phrases with rises indicating continuation and falls closures (Cruttenden, 1997) . In conversations, this is interpreted as the maintenance (I will say more) or closure (it's your turn) of a turn. It is fairly plausible to think of rises and falls for turn organisation as the basic meaning for the linguistic expression of questions and assertions. Here we could try to find out whether closure and continuation in music are comparable in form and function.
This already opens a related dimension of linguistic meaning, which relates propositions to the flow of the discourse they further develop (Chafe, 1976; Krifka, 2007) . The basic notions of information structure are related to our knowledge about the presuppositions of our discourse, which are given either by propositions of previous utterances or by pragmatic inference from the semantic frames of active discourse topics, and to those parts of our utterances which defer from these presuppositions. Presuppositions are the content of the common ground of our discourse, while those parts of utterances which make a difference are called focus. In a sense, this dimension of meaning is directly related to the two main forces which drive conversational implicature in Paul Grice's (1975) groundbreaking theory of how to make sense out of propositions by pragmatic means: relevance and difference. Relevance, or relation, as it is called by Grice himself, is a maxim which needs propositions to be attached to what is said (or represented in a different communicative channel) before, to the common ground in terms of the theory of information structure. The communicative principle behind focus is not discussed by Grice, but could be easily accommodated within his theory of pragmatic inference: difference. The corresponding maxim would sound like a commercial slogan: Be different! This maxim is hidden, because it is so obvious. It motivates for instance our meaningful interpretations of superficially senseless redundancy as in war is war or a rose is a rose is a rose is a rose (Gertrude Stein). We cannot represent the meanings of the repeated expressions in the very same way, but normally interpret first names of classes of referents and then features associated with these classes, resulting in readings which automatically project predicative structures like war is cruel or a rose is red and a symbol of love and an object of art (or whatever you might associate with war or rose). Linguistic utterances must be both relevant and different, otherwise they don't mean anything. The tension between relevance and difference might turn out to be an important restriction also on musical utterances.
Emotional content is conveyed in musical and in linguistic utterances. Intonation and speech rate seem to provide the major linguistic domains for this domain of meaning (Scherer, 2003; Kotz & Paulmann, 2007) . With respect to emotion, music and language are directly comparable and it seems plausible that we will find parallel form-meaning pairs, with the difference that in music composers intend to evoke certain emotions, while in most linguistic utterances they are but indices of the actual affective state of the speaker.
A last domain of meaning I want to mention here is social indexicality (Eckert, 2008 ). When we speak and when we make music, we construct our social role. In language, we have rich lexical, syntactic and phonological options which we choose in order to build the social reality we find adequate. With respect to music, the difference between the social interpretation of listening to Jazz, Punk or Classical Music does not need any explanation.
In this comment, I have just identified six different domains of meaning we observe in linguistic utterances. I will not claim that this sketch of linguistic meanings is exhaustive or innovative, but rather draw attention to the fact that these levels of meaning are intertwined and correspond to musical meaning in a complex and not in a simple manner. The major difference between linguistic and musical meanings lies in the lack of full-fledged propositions with a rich inventory of logical, pragmatic and deictic operators in music. All other domains of meaning can be found also in music and form a rich field for research. So Barnard is definitely right in claiming that propositions are what makes the difference between musical and linguistic meaning and his theory about the development of our cognitive architecture is quite convincing. But propositions surely aren't the only domain of linguistic meaning and I think that we can discover more relations between music and language and their evolution if we look at particular form-meaning pairs in all domains of meaning, including emotional, social, conversational and pragmatic meanings. For future research, I conclude that we should not always ask ourselves the big Faustian questions about "whatever holds the world together in its inmost folds", but rather develop more subtle questions. Tusks and trunks instead of elephants.
